Roy J. Adams' Proposai for a Training Levy Scheme
Ross MARTIN and Errol BLACK Roy J. Adams' proposai for a training levy scheme for Canada is very timely 1 , coming as it does at a time when we face the paradoxical situation of relatively high unemployment co-existing with apparent shortages in skilled occupations. In September, 1980, the Brandon and District Labour Council proposed a similar scheme in a brief presented to the fédéral government Employment Opportunities for the 80's Task Force, chaired by Warren Allmand 2 . The two proposais are similar in many respects, but there are also some important différences which we believe merit discussion.
THE CONTEXT FOR A TRAINING LEVY SCHEME
To begin with, Adams neglects to situate the rôle of training in the broader context of the current problems facing the Canadian eeonomy. Briefly summarized, his analysis is as follows. Existing training arrangements in Canada are inadéquate. To correct thèse inadequacies and increase the output of trained manpower, new arrangements should be instituted. Of the proposais currently on the agenda, the one which holds out the most promise both on equity and efficiency grounds is some form of training levy scheme. Introduction of such a scheme, even on a very modest basis, would yield many benefits, among them: an increase in the quality of job opportunities available to women, teenagers and other individuals caught in dead end jobs; an increase in the supply of skilled craftsmen; and rising productivity.
We do not share Adams' optimism that a training levy scheme, or any other training scheme, will, of and in itself, lead to the results he predicts. Indeed, in the absence of other, prior, institutional changes we doubt that a training levy scheme would hâve very much impact at ail. This becomes évi-dent if the "unemployment-shortage of skilled workers" paradox is confronted head on.
The overall trend in unemployment in Canada over the last 20 years has been upwards. Thus, for the three periods 1962-69, 1972-79 and 1976- April, 1974 and April, 1980. main factors, namely, structural changes in the economy which hâve led to the displacement of workers, and the failure of aggregate spending to grow at a rate sufficient to provide jobs for an expanding work force.
In theory, the government has the capacity to regulate the rate of growth in the economy, so as to ensure that sufficient jobs are available to both displaced workers and new workers coming into the labour market. In practice, the government has failed to develop policies which would permit this objective to be achieved. As we see it, the main problem with government policy in Canada is that it is predicated on the assumption that government's rôle in the economy is a residual one; specifically, government policies are intended to create an environment favourable to private sector investment. This rôle is not, of course, a trivial one. On the contrary, government attempts to create such an environment hâve led to an expanded and more sophisticated rôle for the public sector in the economy.
The point is, however, that this assumption ignores one of the main lessons we learned -or should hâve learned -from the Great Dépression: we cannot rely on market forces and private investment décisions to achieve social objectives. So long as the basic décisions on investment spending are vested in private individuals -firms, it is impossible for government to ensure that the timing and volume of investment spending will be compatible with the requirements of the economy and population. Moreover, along with the problem of regulating the timing and volume of investment, there are also the questions of its composition -for example, manufacturing vs. services -and its régional disposition.
In our view, the unemployment problem will persist in this country until we develop new institutional mechanisms for regulating investment spending, mechanisms which involve the replacement of market forces and private control of investment spending by planning and collective control.
The explanation for the apparent shortage of skilled/trained manpower has its origins in the same phenomenon which underlies the high level of unemployment; the initiative for the bulk of the training undertaken in the economy is left to private sector initiative. This has several important implications. First, private sector firms will provide only that training which serves their immédiate interests and enhances profitability. This means that the bulk of organized training provided in the private sector tends to be firm-specific or industry-specific. Consequently, the skills acquired through such training are not fully transportable to other firms and industries. Secondly, training tends to be cyclical in nature. Thus, during a downturn in the economy -or a period of stagnation -training programmes are curtailed and trainees laid off. Then during the upturn there are insufficient skilled workers to meet manpower requirements. And thirdly, firms will only undertake training if it is less costly than other options, such as raiding the workforces of other companies and immigration. Even then, they will seek to hâve the government underwrite the costs of the training.
Hère again the conclusion we reach is that shortages of skilled workers are attributable to our reliance on the private sector. The solution is the same: more public sector control and planning. With greater planning and control over investment spending, we will be able to generate jobs when they are required and in the industries and régions where they are required. At the same time, our ability to forecast manpower requirements and adjust training programs accordingly will be much enhanced.
Without the capacity to control and plan, new innovations in training arrangements will corne to naught.
THE DETAILS OF THE SCHEME
The main différence in the détails of our proposai and that of Adams lies in the treatment of provinces and the définition of a rôle for trade unions. On the question of tying in the provinces, Adams simply says that it would be désirable to hâve joint action by the fédéral and provincial governments 4 . In contrast, we would argue that the fédéral government should impose the levy -which we proposed be one percent of payroll, and then allocate the funds to the provinces on the basis of the proportion of the total Canadian workforce located in the province. (For example, Manitoba, which has approximately 4.0 percent of the total Canadian workforce, would receive 4.0 percent of the total training fund.) Moreover, the mechanism for screening applications and approving projects should be decentralized. In our brief, we proposed the création of a screening board in each province comprised of three trade union représen-tatives, two employer représentatives and one représentative from each of the fédéral and provincial governments.
This approach would, we believe, ensure the co-operation of most provincial governments.
On the question of the rôle for trade unions in a training levy scheme, Adams argues that their input should be restricted to the collective bargaining process on the grounds that we should avoid imposing constraints on employers. We reject this argument. Indeed, in our brief we proposed that one of the criteria that should be imposed on the provincial screening bodies in the assessment of projects is that applications from unionized firms should not be considered unless they hâve the approval of the union. The justification for this is that we believe training should be related to the longterm needs of workers and Canadian society, not the immédiate needs of capital. That trade unions, as représentatives of workers, are better placed to assess such needs than the custodians of capital should be obvious. Capital is mobile and has but a single interest, namely, earning profits. Workers, in contrast, are immobile; hère for the duration. Consequently, they are obliged to consider the interests of society; indeed, they are society. The record of the trade unions in fighting for reforms bénéficiai to past, current and coming générations of workers speaks for itself.
